SHIKHAR Mains 2023 Day 8 - Model Answer English

Updated : 14th Jun 2023

Q1: भारत के राष्ट्रपति की वीटो शक्तियों पर प्रकाश डालिए। राज्यपाल की वीटो शक्तियां राष्ट्रपति की शक्तियों से किस प्रकार भिन्न हैं?

Highlight the veto powers of the President of India. How does the veto powers of the Governor differ from that of the President? (8 Marks)

Approach:

Introduce by giving a brief account on the veto powers of the President of India.
Bring out the differences between the veto powers of the Governor and the President.
Use appropriate facts wherever needed.

Answer:

The power of veto refers to the power of the executive to override any act of the legislature. This is a very special privilege. Under Article 111 of the Constitution, all bills passed by the Parliament can become an act only if it receives the assent of the President. Hence, the President enjoys a veto power, by withholding his assent to a bill.

Veto power of the President of India can be of the following types:

Absolute Veto: It refers withholding of assent to the Bill passed by the legislature. It was used by the President in case of PEPSU Appropriation Bill in 1954 and Salary, Amendments and Pension of Members of Parliament (Amendment) Bill in 1991.
Suspensive Veto: It is veto which can be overridden by the legislature with an ordinary majority. The President of India used it in case of Office of Profit Bill in 2006.
Pocket Veto: It empowers the President to not take any action on the Bill passed by the legislature.

The President of India used this veto in case of Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill in 1986.

The President enjoys all three vetoes with respect to ordinary bills but in case of money bill, he/she only has absolute veto. The President cannot return a money bill for the reconsideration of the Parliament.

The governor also has similar powers at the state level with respect to the state bills – ordinary and money bills. However, in both the cases, governor has an additional veto power of reserving the bill for consideration of the President. When a bill is reserved for the consideration of the President he has following options:

With regard to the State’s ordinary bill: The President can either give his/her assent to the bill or use his/ her absolute or suspensive or pocket veto. If the bill is passed after reconsideration by the concerned State Legislature in case of suspensive veto then the President may give his assent to a bill or even withhold his assent. The Governor does not have any further role in the enactment of the bill.
With regard to the State’s Money bill: The President can either give his/her assent to the bill or use his/ her absolute veto. The President cannot return a money bill for the reconsideration of the state legislature similar to what happens in the case of Parliament.

Q2. राज्यों में विधान परिषदें खर्चीली और अनावश्यक विधायी उपांग हैं। इस संदर्भ में विधान परिषदों की उपयोगिता का परीक्षण कीजिए, साथ ही उन्हें स्थापित करने और समाप्त करने के प्रक्रियात्मक पहलू पर टिप्पणी कीजिए ?

Legislative Councils in states are expensive and otherwise superfluous legislative appendages. Examine the utility of legislative councils in this context. Also, comment on the procedural aspect of setting up and abolishing them. (12 Marks)

Approach:

Provide a brief introduction of legislative councils.
Explain their significance and the adhoc demands made by the states regarding creating and abolishing them.
Provide arguments for and against legislative councils.
Finally, comment on the procedural aspect of creation and abolition of legislative councils in the light of recent developments.

Answer:

Article 169 lays down the procedure of creation and abolition of a State Legislative council. Legislative councils serve the purpose of upper house in states like Rajya Sabha at the centre however have much less power. Currently, seven states have legislative councils.

The desirability of a bicameral legislature at the State level has been debated since the days of the Constituent Assembly, and recent developments have revived the debate.

Arguments against Legislative Councils:

Superfluous legislative appendages: If a majority of the members in the upper house belong to the same party which holds majority in the lower house, the upper house will become a mere ditto chamber.
Not an Effective Check: Powers of the Legislative Councils are limited to the extent that they can hardly impose any effective check on the Assemblies. It can only delay a bill by four months.
Backdoor Entrance of the Defeated Members: It is apprehended by the critics that a Legislative Council may be utilized to accommodate discredited party-men who may not be returned to the Assemblies.
Costly Institution: Bicameralism in the States is an expensive experiment and a big drain on the State’s exchequer.
A Heterogeneous Chamber: A blend of direct election, indirect election and nomination makes the Council a hotchpotch of representation. A chamber so heterogeneously constituted, neither serves the purpose of a revisory chamber nor acts as an effective brake against hasty legislation.

However, it is also argued that legislative councils can check against hasty legislation, despotic tendencies of lower chamber and can accommodate talented persons who don’t want to contest assembly elections.

Procedural aspect:

The creation and abolition of legislative councils is currently at the whims of state government and union parliament as state Legislative Assembly can pass a resolution for the creation and abolition of councils and the Union Parliament passes a laws for it.
In this context, a parliamentary committee, examining the Rajasthan and Assam bills relating to creation of the Legislative Council, suggested that there should be a national policy on having a permanent second chamber so that a subsequent government cannot abolish it at its whim.
This is a better way to address the issue instead of relying on ad-hocism. While framing such a policy, it will also have to be decided whether the time and resources involved in having a second chamber is worth spending.